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Article 10

Concluding Remarks
By

PETER HAY

I was delighted to note rather substantial agreement between
Professor Trautman and me. There are, of course, areas in which
we differ, although often these are differences in emphasis or nuance rather than of a fundamental nature. My disagreement with
respect to "multistate policies" relates to their formulation by the
local forum: there is little evidence that the local forum is really
sensitive to the needs of the multistate system. This is the current
parochialism in choice of law, which Professor Trautman also acknowledges. Hence my preference for a federal role (legislative or
judicial) in the ordering of the relations between and among the
states and between and among states and foreign nations.1
I agree with Professor Trautman that it is important "to weed
out the parochialism in the choice-of-law method ' 2 that inheres in
Professors Currie and Ehrenzweig's approaches. But I do think,
more so than does Professor Trautman, that the restriction of jurisdiction is also important-not to the point advocated by Professor Ehrenzweig or Justice O'Connell,$ but along.the lines of the
recent jurisdictional decisions. I endorse the current development,
not in order thereby to "bury" the choice-of-law decision, but to
particularize further the current "foreseeability" test, for instance,
as it may apply to transient jurisdiction. Again, this is only a matter of emphasis because one of my main points had been that the
jurisdictional problem, affecting largely the issue of party conveniencd, is not as important as the choice-of-law issue, which affects
party liability.4 Given this orientation, I do find attractive the
point of Professor Trautman that the determination of judicial jurisdiction should involve an "assessment of the relative positions of
1. See Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTxNGS L.J. 1644,
1673-75 (1981).
2. Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASrINGs L.J. 1612,
1625 (1981).
3. See Hay, supra note 1, at 1651 n.43.
4. Id. at 1676.
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the plaintiff and the defendant," 5 rather than a focus exclusively
on the defendant. Thus, I could accept the exercise of jurisdiction
over a minimally connected or even unconnected defendant as long
as this does not mean more or less automatic application of the law
of the forum. However, I do fear that, in the case of the "minimally connected" defendant, the present equation of minimum
contacts for jurisdiction and choice of law would lead to that result. For this reason, then, I am prepared to solve an unacceptable
choice-of-law result by means of stricter, defendant-oriented, jurisdidtional standards.
Professor Trautman and I share the view that governmentalinterest analysis, to which Professor Sedler adheres, contains aspects that are "untenable," ' particularly a parochial forum bias
and the overemphasis on "governmental" interests. Professor Sedler writes that we should be "more concerned with the question of
'what is the proper result' instead of 'what is the proper rationale' ,,7 and concludes that, in his view, "the present state of conflicts law.., is quite good"8 as a consequence of "the simplifying
effect of interest analysis."'
I submit that a result-orientation
without regard to an underlying rationale leads to ad hoc determinations and, more often than not, to the forum bias to which I
objected in my paper on several grounds. There are indeed a number of decisions-of which Hague1" is but one-that are not
"good." I do not advocate sterile inquiry into rationales, an inquiry that is divorced from the purpose of asking the question. Of
course, our concern must be for the proper result. But, just as I
believe that the first Restatement's ultimate weakness was that
"the tension between 'conflicts justice' and 'substantive justice'
[had grown] too large,"1 1 so do I believe that result-selectivity
5.

Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32

HASTINGS

L.J. 1612,

1623 (1981).
6. Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1644, 1659-62
(1981). Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1612,
1614 (1981). See also Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH.L. REv. 392 (1980).
7. Sedler, ConcludingRemarks 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1681, 1683 (1981).
8. Id. at 1682.
9. Id.
10. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S.Ct. 633 (1981), discussed in Hay, Reflections on
Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1644, 1656-59 (1981). See also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 328-31 (2d ed. 1980) (discussion of the "better-law" approach, which so often forms part of forum-centered interest analysis).
11. Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1644, 1666

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

without rationale (other than one with a built-in forum bias) ultimately also does not lead to "justice," at least not if we accept
such traditional conflicts values as fairness and predictability.
There is, to my mind, a link-a necessary link-between "substantive justice" and "conflicts justice. '12 Many modern choice-of-law
decisions based on governmental-interest analysis (with a dash of
the "better-law" approach) are truly ad hoc efforts. They may or
may not achieve a just result in the particular case. But that is not
the point. Except for the occasional outrageous case,1 3 we do not
decide ordinary contract, trust, or other cases that way. Why then
in conflicts? Is "justice," in an ad hoc approach, not often in the
eye of the beholder? To be sure, conflicts cases also implicate multistate concerns and policies not present in the intrastate civil case.
The question then becomes who should address these factors that
are peculiar to the conflicts case? This, in my view, is the "ordering" function of which I wrote14 and which should not be left to
each individual and, by hypothesis, self-interested forum.

(1981).
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1670.
See id. at 1661 n.99.
See id. at 1676.

